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Before and After the Hartz Reforms:
The Performance of Active Labour Market Policy
in Germany*
Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
Having faced high unemployment rates for more than a decade, the German govern-
ment implemented a comprehensive set of labour market reforms during the period
2003Ð2005. This paper describes the economic and institutional context of the German
labour market before and after these so-called Hartz reforms. Focussing on active
policy measures, we delineate the rationale for reform and its main principles.A s
preliminary results of programme evaluation studies post-reform have become avail-
able just now, we give a firsta ssessment of the effectiveness of key elements of German
active labour market policy before and after the Hartz reforms. The evidence indicates
that the re-organisation of public employment services was mainly successful, with the
exception of the outsourcing of services. Re-designing training programmess eems to
have improved their effectiveness, while job creation schemes continue to be detrimen-
tal for participants’ employment prospects. Wage subsidies and start-up subsidiess how
significantly positive effects. On balance, therefore, the reform seems to be moving the
German labour market in the right direction.
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1 Introduction
In times of high unemployment, the necessity for
labour market reforms is discussed all over Europe.
Many countries have either started or already fin-
ished far-reaching reforms.A l so in Germany the
need for reforms had become apparent over the past
decades, when unemployment was rising constantly
and public budgets tightened. Finally in 2002, the
government took advantage of a scandal involving
the Federal Employment Services1 to overcome the
so-called reform bottleneck (“Reformstau”) and
start a series of rather radical Ð given the prior re-
luctance Ð changes of active and passive labour
market policies.
The resulting Hartz reforms Ð named after the
chairman heading the independent expert commis-
sion that worked out the blueprint for the reform
package2 Ð are considered the most far-reaching re-
form endeavour in the history of the German wel-
fare state, and consist of four laws, the so-called
Hartz IÐIV laws, that were implemented step by
step on Jan 1st 2003 (Hartz I and II), Jan 1st 2004
(Hartz III) and Jan 1st 2005 (Hartz IV). While Hartz
IV constitutes a comprehensive modification of the
unemployment benefit and social assistance
schemes, Hartz IÐIII modernised the organisational
structure of the public employment services, modi-
fied many of the already existing measures of Active
Labour Market Policy (ALMP) and introduced a set
of new ones. The laws contain a set of specific policy
measures that merge to a three-part reform strategy:
(a) improving employment services and policy
measures, (b) activating the unemployed, and (c)
stimulating employment demand by deregulating
the labour market.
In this context, it is also the first time in the history
of the German welfare state that a policy reform is
accompanied by a comprehensive scientific evalua-
tion. The government explicitly tied the implemen-
tation of the Hartz laws to an evaluation mandate.
The Hartz laws IÐIII were evaluated during the
years 2004 to 2006, and Hartz IV will be evaluated
from 2006 onwards. Given the scope of the reform
endeavour, the evaluation of Hartz IÐIII was com-
missioned by the government as a set of work pack-
ages and modules, aiming at an evaluation of both
the Hartz reforms in their entirety and each particu-
lar element on its own. In practice, the Hartz IÐ
III evaluation has therefore involved more than 20
1 The Federal Employment Services were accused of massive
fraud in the reporting of successful job placements.
2 “Commission for Modern Labour Market Services”( Kommis-
sion für Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt).
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economic and sociological research institutes which,
using methods based on qualitative case study ap-
proaches as well as rigorous econometric analyses of
administrative and survey data, face the challenge
of disentangling the impacts of specific measures
in a setting characterised (a) by the simultaneous
alteration of measures and institutional context, and
(b) by the fact that many of the measures affect ev-
ery worker, i.e. no comparison group exists.F i r st re-
sults of these evaluation studies have become availa-
ble just now.
In this paper, we describe the economic and institu-
tional context of the German labour market before
and after the reforms. Focussing on active policy
measures, we delineate the rationale for reform and
its main principles.W eu se the most recent empirical
evidence to discuss the effectiveness of key elements
of German ALMP before and after the Hartz re-
forms.I th a s to be noted, however, that at present
the evidence regarding policy effectiveness after
Hartz is based on rather short observation periods,
and therefore the findings are still preliminary at the
present time.
The paper is organised as follows: section one gives
an overview of the German economic situation since
unification in 1990, briefly characterising the prob-
lematic features of the eastern and western German
labour markets.W ea l sod e scribe the institutional
framework before Hartz, focussing on active labour
market policies and the organisational structure of
public employment services, and discuss the main
weaknesses of the institutional setting that moti-
vated the reform. Section three delineates core ele-
ments of the Hartz reforms and the reform strategy
in some detail. In section four we review both the
hitherto existing and the most recent evidence from
evaluation research to assess the effectiveness of ac-
tive labour market policy before and after the re-
form. Section five concludes.
2 Economic situation and labour
market institutions before Hartz
Since the 1990s, Germany has proved to be unable
to benefit from favourable conditions in the global
economy. From 1991 until 2003 GDP grew by only
18%, which is half the growth of the United King-
dom (35%) or the Netherlands (34%) during that
period. At the same time, employment even de-
creased slightly (by 0.4%) and unemployment rates
are higher than ever, ranging between 9.6% in west-
ern and 18.6% in eastern Germany in 2005.
Certainly the unification in 1990 and its repercus-
sions have contributed to Germany’s poor perform-Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
ance. Unification suddenly increased the labour
force by roughly one third, a large share of which
was inadequately trained for immediate employ-
ment in an open market economy. Despite the need
to first retrain the labour force and reshape the for-
merly centrally planned economy, however, it was
a core political objective to adjuste a stern German
wages to the comparatively high western German
levels as quickly as possible. In contrast to other
Central and Eastern European transition countries
having competitive wages levels to create sustain-
able growth, the eastern German economy experi-
enced rising unemployment and continuing depen-
dence on federal subsidies and transfer payments
from Westt oE a st. In addition to the high fiscal
costs of unification, the Maastricht criteria further
reduced the government’ss cope for expansive
growth policies.
Only a small share of overall German unemploy-
ment is thought to be attributable to business cycle
factors. Some studies argue that the German
NAIRU has increased over the past decades (e.g.
Franz 2001), indicating that structural factors play
an important role in the German unemployment
problem.
Figure 1 shows the trend in employment subject to
social security contributions (sozialversicherungs-
pflichtige Beschäftigung) and the trend in employ-
ment with low pay for which exemption from social
security contributions applies (geringfügig entlohnte
Beschäftigung). In western Germany, we observe a
decrease in the number of employees covered by
social security since 2002. Almost at the same time,
low-wage employment hass teadily increased. In
eastern Germany, the decrease in regular employ-
ment and the increase in low-wage employment can
already be found at the beginning of the observation
period in 2000.
In Figure 2 we see the number of unemployed indi-
viduals and the number of participants in training
and job creation programmes for western and east-
ern Germany during the time period 1991 to 2005.
We observe a general increase in the number of un-
employed individuals in both parts of the country.
Whereas in western Germany the number of pro-
gramme participants was relatively stable over this
period, decreasing only slightly, the figures for east-
ern Germany document the massive use of ALMP
measures during the early 1990s and a substantial
decrease over recent years.
Labour market institutions
Compulsory unemployment insurance was intro-
duced in Germany as early as in 1927, complement-
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ing the then already existing insurances for health,
accident and old age. After World War II a generous
benefit system emerged, financed by contributions
and taxes. Active labour market measures were in-
troduced when unemployment started to rise in the
1970s. Both active and passive policy measures are
administered by the Federal Employment Services.
In earlier years, when unemployment wass till low,
measures were designed to prevent rather than com-
bat unemployment, adapting the workforce to struc-
tural changes in labour demand. After unification in
1990, active labour market measures played a cen-
tral role in alleviating the social consequences of the
breakdown of the economy in eastern Germany. In
1992, for instance, the number of people participat-
ing in either a job creation or training programme
exceeded the number of unemployed (Figure 2).
The set-up of active and passive labour market pol-
icy in Germany during the 1990s can be character-
ised as follows: from the very beginning, unemploy-
ment benefits were meant to maintain the worker’s
social status during unemployment rather than pro-
viding a safety net as al a str e sort. All payments
made to the individual over the entire period of un-
employment were linked to his or her previous earn-
ings. Unemployment benefits, which were paid for
the first 6 to 32 months of unemployment (depend-
ing on previous employment duration and age),
amounted to 67% of the last net income (60% with-
out children), with a maximum level of 4250 EUR
per month. Unemployment assistance, which was
paid after entitlement to unemployment benefit ex-
pired and without a time limit, still reached 57%
(53%) of the last net income.
The unlimited duration of unemployment benefit
payments was an extraordinary feature of the Ger-
man unemployment benefit system, leading to re-
placement rates for long-term unemployed which
were higher than in any other OECD country
(OECD 2004). The replacement rates of short-term
unemployed, in contrast, were Ð and still are Ð com-
parable to many other OECD countries. Unemploy-
ment benefits were financed by unemployment in-
surance contributionss hared by employers and em-
ployees, while unemployment assistance was fi-
nanced by taxes. In principle, unemployment assist-
ance was means-tested on a yearly basis.I tw a s
possible to supplement unemployment benefits with
tax-financed social assistance. Generally, every
household whose income fell below a certain income
threshold qualified for social assistance.
The German benefit system combined generous
benefit levels with high benefit reduction rates that
taxed away most of a benefit recipient’s additionalBefore and After the Hartz Reforms Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
earned income. Thus, incentives to take up a job
were very low, especially for low-skilled workers.
Engels (2001) calculates that a typical family with
three children receiving social assistance in western
Germany in the year 2000 received an income that
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was only 15.3% below that of a comparable family
with a single earner receiving an average unskilled
worker’s wage. In eastern Germany the respective
difference was only 11.5%.Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
Compared with other countries, German active la-
bour market policy in the 1990s was characterised
by high expenditure levels and long durations of
programmes. Training and public job creation meas-
ures were the most important programmes in terms
ZAF 1/2007 49
of expenditure and number of participants. Meas-
uress upporting the direct integration into regular
employment (e.g. wage subsidies and start-up subsi-
dies) only played a minor role. Generally, job search
assistance and monitoring by the public employmentBefore and After the Hartz Reforms Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
services was given rather low priority. Sanctions for
low engagement in job search activities were rarely
implemented. For most programmes, the law nar-
rowly defined the type of person who was eligible
for participation in a programme. Assignment to
programmes was not based on a systematic individ-
ual profiling of each client, but rather on casework-
ers’d i scretion.
3 Core elements of the Hartz reforms
As unemployment continued to increasei nt h e
1990s, the social security system ran the risko ff i -
nancial collapse and the need for a comprehensive
reform of the institutional setting of labour market
policies became urgent. In both the political and
academic debates the benefit system was criticised
for creating work disincentives and increasing long-
term unemployment, deteriorating skills and thus
worsening the mismatch on the labour market. The
public employment services were accused of operat-
ing inefficiently, being customer-unfriendly and fail-
ing to push job seekerss ufficiently to search for a
job. The mix of active measures, focussing on train-
ing measures and public job creation schemes with
long durations,w a s criticised for keeping partici-
pants out of the open labour market instead of inte-
grating them. Such criticismw a s based on evalua-
tion studies of active measures that indicated severe
locking-in effects and zero or even negative post-
participation treatment effects of many programmes
(e.g. Lechner 2000; Caliendo et al. 2003).
The so-called Hartz reforms, which were subse-
quently implemented during the period 2003Ð2005,
coalesce to a tripartite reform strategy (cf. Table 1).
They aimed at (a) improving labour market services
and policy measures in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency, (b) activating the unemployed by enforc-
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ing the so-called principle of “rights and duties”
(Fördern und Fordern), and (c) stimulating employ-
ment demand by deregulating the labour market.3
To this end, the reform modified many of the al-
ready existing measures of active labour market pol-
icy and introduced a set of new measures. It funda-
mentally changed the general framework in which
these measures operate and involved greater co-or-
dination of institutional arrangements,e specially be-
tween active and passive policy measures. Deregu-
lating measures concentrated on the temporary
work sector, while the biggest changes entailed by
the reform took place in the realm of job placement
services and the benefit system.
3.1 Increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of services and measures
The reform aimed to improve the performance of
placement services and policy programmes mainly
by introducing market mechanisms to the realm of
placement services and by streamlining public em-
ployment services. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness
in the specific context of each regional labour mar-
ket is targeted to be the key criterion when choosing
programme contents and participants.
First, regarding their organisational structure, the
public employment services were modernised along
the lines of New Public Management. The reform
established results-based accountability and control-
ling of local employment offices. Now, each employ-
ment office has to fulfil quantitative goals which are
individually set for each type of agency, while at the
3 The Federal Employment Service translates “Fördern und For-
dern” as “Challenge and Promotion”.Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
same time having a wider scope of discretion on the
choice of policy mix. The formerly hierarchically or-
ganised employment offices are to be converted into
customer-orientated one-stop-centres. The range of
services provided has been extended, ranging from
advising and counselling services to social services
and the administration of benefit payments.T h e
caseload of caseworkers is targeted to be reduced
and every job seeker is assigned to a particular case-
worker.
A second aspect regards quasi markets: the intro-
duction of market forces is expected to improve the
quality of services and to break up the informal and
often inefficient insider relationships between public
employment management and private providers.
The reform introduced, for instance, voucher sys-
tems for placement services (Vermittlungsgutschein)
and training measures (Bildungsgutschein). Each in-
dividual whom the public employment service has
been unable to place after six weeks of unemploy-
ment can choose an alternative private placement
service. The private service receives a lump sum
payment after having placed the job seeker success-
fully. Providers of training measures, too, can be
chosen freely by the client and paid for with a
voucher.
The public employment service can chooset oout-
source services fully or partly, most importantly
placement services. Public tendering became com-
pulsory for external contracts. One example is place-
ment via temporary work: since 2003, every local
employment office sets up a “Staff Service Agency”
(Personal Service Agentur (PSA)) that acts as a tem-
porary work agency for the unemployed. To this
end, the local employment office may either con-
tract out to a private temporary work agency or, if
no provider is available, may run a PSA itself. The
local employment office may delegate hard-to-place
clients to the PSA, which in return receives a
monthly lump sum fee for employing these workers.
The PSA may hire out the worker temporarily to
other firms or provide a permanent placement. The
PSA receives a bonus for each placement into em-
ployment lasting at least three months and another
bonus if the placed person iss till employed after six
months. During periods of inactivity, the PSA
should provide training measures to the worker.
Therefore, PSAs encompass aspects of both training
measures and placement services.
Third, the reform aims at improving the targeting of
active measures and the allocation of measures and
resources. To this end, the statutory regulation of eli-
gibility conditions is reduced, now leaving a wider
scope for individually matching clients to measures.
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The assignment of clients to measures is now based
on a profiling process, which is highly standardised.
The caseworker will assess the client’s abilities,
problems and potential labour market chances in an
interview and then assign the client to one of four
types: “Market clients”( Marktkunden) are consid-
ered to have the highest chances of finding employ-
ment, “clients for counselling and activation” (Bera-
tungskunden aktivieren) range second and mainly
need to be activated in their job search. “Clients for
counselling and support” (Beratungskunden för-
dern) need more attention and are likely to be as-
signed to a programme, while “clients in need of su-
pervision” (Betreuungskunden) need special atten-
tion since they face the lowest chances of re-employ-
ment. Each type is linked to an action programme,
defining the available measures for that type of job
seeker. Active labour market policy measures are
available mainly for the types II “counselling and
activating” and III “counselling and support”. The
type I “market client” is expected to re-integrate
without special assistance, while the fourth type,
“supervision”, is deemed unlikely to benefit from
any measure and excluded from participation.
Many active policy measures were re-designed in
terms of their target population. For example, since
the reform, selection into training measures deliber-
ately uses cream skimming in order to choose those
clients who will benefit most from training. Only cli-
ents who are conjectured to have a 70% probability
of finding a job after the measure will be admitted.
Accordingly, training providers have to produce a
70% success rate of respective participants in order
to be commissioned by the employment agency. In
contrast, job creation measures have been re-de-
signed to target only the very hard-to-place unem-
ployed. This means that public employment will
constitute market replacement and thereby preserve
employability for those who are not expected to find
a way back into regular employment in the near fu-
ture. Incentives for unemployed workers to take up
public employment rather than regular employment
were reduced as participants no longer regain eli-
gibility for unemployment benefits after completing
the measure. The restrictive targeting of training
and job creation schemes as well as the reduction of
programme durations induced a further reduction of
participants in and spending on these measures.O n
average, participation in training will take place at
an earlier stage in the unemployment spell.
Last but not least, the need for rigorous scientific
evaluation of programme effectiveness, in order to be
able to optimise existing programmes continuously
on the basis of conclusive empirical evidence, was
recognized by policy makers, and a correspondingBefore and After the Hartz Reforms Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
evaluation mandate was implemented with the
Hartz reforms. Hence, the Hartz reforms constitute
the first major reform in the history of the German
welfare state that is accompanied by a comprehen-
sive scientific evaluation on behalf of the govern-
ment. The process started with two competing pilot
studies developing a conceptual framework for the
evaluation (Fertig et al. 2004; Hagen and Spermann
2004) and wass ubsequently put out to tender. Cur-
rently more than 20 economic and sociological re-
search institutes with about 100 researchers are in-
volved in the evaluation (cf. Bundesregierung 2006
for details of the set-up).
3.2 Activation of the unemployed
The principle of “rights and duties”i s the core ele-
ment of the Hartz reforms. The activation strategy
is implemented in virtually every element of the la-
bour market policy framework. The new policy mix
is more strongly orientated towards measures for
job seekers who actively seek to improve their situa-
tion in a self-responsible way. There is more empha-
sis on measures that promote the direct integration
into the labour market as opposed to training meas-
ures and public job creation schemes that keep par-
ticipants out of the market for the duration of the
programme. The active measures that best represent
the new activation strategy are the start-up subsi-
dies.T h e se are a relatively new component of Ger-
man active labour market policy. Though a so-called
“bridging allowance” (Überbrückungsgeld) was in-
troduced as early as 1986, the number of partici-
pants has increased only recently. The benefit is paid
for 6 months and is equal to the unemployment ben-
efit that the recipient had previously received or
could have received plus a flat-rate social security
contribution. In order to receive the subsidy, the
chamber of commerce has to approve the business
plan. The reform introduced an alternative subsidy,
the so-called “Me, Inc.” (Ich-AG) subsidy, which is
independent of prior social security contributions.4
It is paid for a maximum period of three years as
long as the claimant’s income does not exceed
25,000 EUR per year. It amounts to 600 EUR per
month in the first year, 360 EUR per month in the
second and 240 EUR per month in the third year.
Furthermore, integration into paid employment may
be supported by several forms of wage subsidies
which are paid to employers when hiring a certain
type of hard-to-place worker. The idea is to compen-
4 The Economist (Feb 2006) translates the subsidy as “Me-com-
pany”.
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sate the firm for the presumably lower productivity
of this type of worker. The Hartz reformss implified
the eligibility conditions of so-called integration sub-
sidies in order to facilitate access to wage subsidies,
giving priority to older and disabled workers. Gen-
erally, the maximum duration varies between 6 and
24 months, depending on the target group and, as a
rule, the maximum rate of subsidy should not ex-
ceed 50% of the calculable remuneration. In order
to avoid substitution effects and free riding, pay-
ments are not available if the employer has appar-
ently dismissed a worker in order to receive the sub-
sidy or if he had already employed the respective
worker within the previous four years. Furthermore,
the Hartz reform introduced social security subsi-
dies for employers who recruit an older worker. A
firm which hires a worker aged 55 or older is exempt
from paying contributions to the unemployment se-
curity system for this worker. However, the contri-
bution amounts to only 3.25% of the gross wage.
Finally, various reform elements intend to make
work pay, aiming at increasing work incentives for
the unemployed. The reform did not reduce the very
high marginal taxes on people who move from un-
employment to employment. Instead, new forms of
wage subsidies were introduced and existing ones
were modified or extended. The start-up subsidies
mentioned above are one example. Furthermore,
the reform introduced incentives for workers aged
50 and older to take up employment even if it pays
less than previous employment. In thesec a ses, older
workers may receive a wage subsidy, the so-called
wage protection, when they accept a job offer that
pays less than their previous job. This wage subsidy
amounts to 50% of the difference between the pre-
vious wage and the current wage. It is paid for the
same duration as the unemployment benefit would
have been paid if the person had remained unem-
ployed.
Before the reform, incomes of up to 325 Euros per
month were exempt from social security contribu-
tions. The reform raised this threshold to 400 Euros,
and substantially simplified the administrative pro-
cedures for these now so-called “minijobs”. In addi-
tion, the reform introduced “midijobs”, a type of
employment with reduced social security contribu-
tions for the income range of 400,01 to 800 Euros
per month. The amount of social security contribu-
tions depends on the gross income and increases
from zero contributions at 400 Euros to full contri-
butions at 800 Euros. Both minijobs and midijobs
are generally applicable, i.e. they are not confined
to the unemployed.
The reform also introduced sanction elements,i . e .
additional ways to effectively monitor the job seek-Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
er’s job search activities and personal efforts to re-
integrate into the labour market. The job seeker is
obliged to accept any offer of suitable work. The
definition of suitable work was broadened, e.g. in-
cluding the obligation to move to a different area
under certain circumstances. Benefit receipt is
strictly conditional on the availability for work and
the availability for programme participation. The in-
dividual action plan that results from the profiling
process iss et out in a binding integration agreement
(Eingliederungsvereinbarung). This written agree-
ment states both the services that will be provided to
the job seeker as well as the job seeker’s obligation
regarding job search activities and programme par-
ticipation, where required. An unemployed individ-
ual will be threatened with sanctions in the form of
temporary benefit reductions if he or she deviates
from the integration agreement or does not cooper-
ate appropriately. A person’s availability can addi-
tionally be tested by training or by workfare meas-
ures in the public sector (the so-called 1-EURO-
Jobs)o ra ssignment to PSAs.
Although in this paper we focus on active labour
market policy (Hartz IÐIII), for the sake of com-
pleteness we will also briefly comment on the strat-
egy for reforming the benefit system (Hartz IV).
Whereas before the reform previouss ocial security
contributions were the key criterion for benefit ac-
cess, now access to benefits and participation in ac-
tive labour market policy programmes iss trictly
conditional on a person’s ability to work. This is de-
fined as being able to work at least 15 hours a week.
Those capable of working are assigned to the em-
ployment agencies and will be subject to activation
policies on the basis of the principle of “rights and
duties”. An unemployed person receivess o-called
benefit type I (Arbeitslosengeld I, or ALG I) for the
first 6 to 12 months of unemployment. Thereafter,
the person receives a flat-rate means-tested benefit
type II (Arbeitslosengeld II, or ALG II). Individuals
who have never paid social security contributions
but who are deemed capable of working will receive
benefit type II right from the beginning. Benefit
type II is not earnings-based, as the unemployment
assistance was in the previouss ystem, and is less
generous than social assistance. Only those who are
not capable of working due to sickness,d i sability or
care responsibilities receive means-tested social as-
sistance from the local authorities and are exempt
from “duties”. Whereas benefit type I is adminis-
tered by the local employment office, benefit type
II is administered at municipal level, either by a co-
operation of the employment office and the munici-
pality (Arbeitsgemeinschaft, ARGE) or by the mu-
nicipality alone (Optierende Kommune).
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3.3 Labour market deregulation
Deregulation of labour market institutions took
place regarding temporary work, dismissal protec-
tion and the regulation of fixed-term contracts.T h e
wage setting process, on the other hand, remains
highly centralised.
Regardingtemporaryworkregulations,thereformin-
tended to facilitate the expansion of the already
boomingsectoroftemporaryworksignificantly.Tem-
porary work agencies were legalised in 1967 and for-
mally regulated in 1972. Since then, temporary work
had been regulated rather restrictively for many
years, and had been forbidden completely in the con-
struction industry. Since the late 1990s, the law has
gradually been liberalised. The Hartz reform finally
abolished restrictions on synchronisation, re-assign-
ment, fixed-term contracts and the maximum dura-
tion oftemporaryemployment. A new rulewas intro-
duced requiring that a temporary work agency must
either guarantee equal pay and equal treatment of
temporary workers and regular workers or join a col-
lective bargaining agreement between trade unions
and employers. Temporary work is now also allowed
intheconstructionindustry,providedthatacollective
bargaining agreement applies. So far, however, no
such contract has been agreed upon. As already men-
tioned, the law introduced publicly sponsored Staff
Service Agencies as a new form of placement-orien-
tated temporary work for hard-to-place individuals.
With respect to dismissal regulations and fixed-term
contract regulations, the reform did not deregulate
standard employment relations in a general way. In-
stead, it simplified and widened the number of cases
for which exemptions from the generally rather re-
strictive regulations apply. Before the reform, for in-
stance, exemptions from restrictions on fixed-term
contractsappliedforemployeesaged58andover.For
these employees, fixed-term contracts could be re-
newed repeatedly without justification. The reform
reduced the minimum age for which this regulation
applies to 52 years.5 Furthermore, exemptions from
dismissal protection, which before the reform were
conceded to small firms with 5 employees or less, will
now apply to firms with up to 10 employees.
4 Labour market policy effectiveness
before and after Hartz
For a long time the evaluation of German ALMP
suffered from a lack of suitable data. Only very re-
5 The reduction of the age threshold for exemptions regarding
fixed-term contracts has meanwhile been declared null and void
by a ruling of the EU Court of Justice.Before and After the Hartz Reforms Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
cently has good quality data become relatively
widely available to researchers. Early studies on
ALMP effectiveness were usually based on the
GSOEP (German SocioEconomic Panel) or, for
eastern Germany, the Labour Market Monitor East.
The main drawback of these data is that, due to
rather small overall sample sizes and panel mortal-
ity, they contain only few observations on partici-
pants of active labour market policy measures. Re-
searchers often had to group together heteroge-
neous measures and some programmes could not be
evaluated at all because participation was not docu-
mented in the data.
It was only at the end of the 1990s that the govern-
ment started to acknowledge the need for a thor-
ough evaluation of active labour market policies,
and, in the following years, considerable effort was
made to derive large data sets from administrative
data at local employment office level (Bender et al.
2005). These data provide a large number of obser-
vations and cover rather long time periods. They
therefore make it possible to detect short-term as
well as long-term effects and provide enough infor-
mation to better distinguish different types of treat-
ment and to analyse the optimal timing of events.
These merged administrative data have recently
been made available to researchers and seem to be
able to provide robustr e sults.M o st of the evalua-
tion studies of the Hartz reforms make useo ft h i s
type of data.
Early evaluation studies mainly concentrated on
training and job creation schemes, which for a long
time were the most important measures in terms of
expenditure and number of participants (recall Fig-
ure 2). Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2000) provide
a survey on early evaluation studies in Germany,
most of which are based on the above-mentioned
rather poor data. Caliendo and Steiner (2005), who
update that review, and Wunsch (2005), who dis-
cusses the development of the German labour mar-
ket since unification, include recent pre-Hartz stud-
ies based on the new and better data. The post-
Hartz studies we discuss in the following sections
are firstr e sults of the evaluations of the Hartz laws
IÐIII. The evaluation of Hartz IV, which basically
comprises the reform of the benefit system and the
introduction of benefit type II combining unemploy-
ment and social assistance, will not begin until the
autumn of 2006.
4.1 Increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of labour market services
and policy measures
Major policy changes aiming at improving the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of existing measures took
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place in the realm of placement services, training
and job creation schemes. In the following, we will
discuss findings from evaluation studies of these
measures before and after the reform. Other active
policy measures that were re-designed under the re-
form are discussed in the next sections.
4.1.1 Placement services
There are only two studies on the effectiveness of
placement services before the reform. The DEA-
based benchmarking study by Mosley et al. (2003)
compares the relative efficiency in terms of activity
(number of placements and programme entrants in
relation to staff inputs) and effectiveness (transi-
tions into regular employment) of western German
local employment offices. The analysis iss upple-
mented with case studies of eight employment offi-
ces. The results indicate strong differences in rela-
tive efficiency. The authors find that exogenous and
endogenous factors each explain roughly 50% of
variation in efficiency. They suggest that the average
efficiency of labour market offices could be in-
creased by 19%. Hujer et al. (2005) study the effects
of two pilot measures of job search assistance (Stel-
lenmarktoffensive) in 2001Ð2002 in the western Ger-
man federal state of Hesse. The regional employ-
ment office published a magazine for employers
containing employment-wanted advertisements
among other things.T h estudy finds positive effects
of this measure, especially for women. Furthermore,
the employment offices offered courses on job
search activities that provide advice on writing ap-
plication letters,C V s, participating in job interviews
etc. Although the effects vary across groups, in gen-
eral these measures do not produce positive results.
The Hartz reform converted the former employ-
ment offices into customer-orientated service cen-
tres (Kundenzentrum). These are assessed in the
study by WZB and infas (2005) using a conditional
difference-in-differences-analysis which exploits the
fact that the customer service centres were intro-
duced at different points in time. Ten employment
service offices that have already been transformed
into customer service centres are matched with ten
offices that have not. Data is used from the inflow
into unemployment of the respective offices. The re-
sults indicate positive effects of customer service
centres on the integration into regular employment,
though the effects are not significant. This might be
due to the fact that the number of offices used in
the analysis iss mall and the observation period at
the present time is a maximum of nine months.T h e
effects are more positive in eastern Germany, where
labour market conditions are worse, and seem to
work better for men than for women.Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
Furthermore, the report studies the outsourcing of
placement services by comparing clients who have
made use of external placement services with clients
who have remained under the public employment
service. External placement services can be utilised
either by the client himself, using a placement
voucher (Vermittlungsgutschein), or by the public
employment service who can assign clients to exter-
nal providers (Beauftragung Dritter). Selection is
controlled for by performing a combination of exact
matching with propensity score matching. The ana-
lysis is based on administrative data which iss upple-
mented by survey data from telephone interviews
for a sub-sample. For placement vouchers, the re-
sults fail to find any significant effect on the
prospects of entering employment. It appears that
many clients who had received placement vouchers
did not actually use them. In eastern Germany,
those who found a job using a placement voucher
remained in employment for a significantly shorter
period than those who did not use placement vouch-
ers. The assignment of clients to private placement
providers by the public employment service does
not show significant effects either. Finally, the as-
signment to PSAs producess ignificant locking-in ef-
fects that delay the integration of workers into regu-
lar, non-PSA employment.
4.1.2 Training measures
Training measures have been evaluated by numer-
ouss tudies. Since studies mostly focus on either
eastern or western Germany, we present results for
each region separately. Early evaluation studies on
training in eastern Germany include Lechner (1998,
1999), Hujer and Wellner (2000) and Lechner
(2000), which are based on the GSOEP. Studies
based on the Labour Market Monitor East include
Hübler (1997) and Fitzenberger and Prey (1998).
Bergemann et al. (2000) use the Labour Market
Monitor East of the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt,
as do Bergemann et al. (2004). Reinowski et al.
(2003, 2004) use the Saxony microcensus. Recent
studies based on merged administrative data are
Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss (2004), Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2005) and Lechner et al. (2005).
Many of the early studies either find positive effects
or are unable to find any significant effects of train-
ing programmes in eastern Germany. One exception
is Hübler (1997), who finds negative effects for
women. This result contrasts with the finding ob-
tained by Bergemann et al. (2000) of significantly
positive effects of second treatments for women
only. Bergemann et al. (2004) find positive effects in
the early 1990s and negative effects in later years.I n
general, studies published from 2000 onwards tend
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to be more pessimistic. Besides Bergemann et al.
(2004), also Lechner (2000) and Reinowski et al.
(2003) find negative effects of training participation.
By and large, the results are mixed and it is rather
unclear what lesson can be drawn from these studies
on the programmes’ effectiveness.
Recent studies based on better administrative data
seem to derive more consistent results. Hujer,
Thomsen and Zeiss (2004) use data from the period
1999Ð2002 and Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005)
cover the period 1993Ð1997. The most comprehen-
sive study is the one by Lechner et al. (2005), who
use data covering the period of 1993 to 2002. Due
to the richness of the data, various types of training
can be distinguished. Fitzenberger and Speckesser
(2005) concentrate on the “provision of specific pro-
fessional skills” which is a special type of further
vocational training programmes. Lechner et al.
(2005) distinguish between short training (up to 6
months), long training (over 6 months), retraining,
and training in practice firms.
All of the studies based on the new data find signifi-
cant evidence of locking-in effects for virtually all
types of training, i.e. the labour market performance
is worse for participants compared with non-partici-
pants during and shortly after participation. The
central question is whether there are positive effects
in the medium and long run that are big enough to
compensate for these negative short-run effects.T h e
answer seems to depend on the outcome variable.
For unemployment duration, Hujer, Thomsen and
Zeiss (2004) do not find significant long-term effects
of short and medium training programmes but find
negative effects of long programmes, which means
they increase unemployment duration (here, a par-
ticipating person is considered unemployed). This
contrasts with the other studies, Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2005) and Lechner et al. (2005), who
take the employment rate as the outcome measure
and find positive effects in the long run for pro-
grammes that provide specific professional skills
(Fitzenberger and Speckesser 2005) as well as for
short training and retraining programmes (Lechner
et al. 2005). Lechner et al. (2005) alsou se monthly
earnings as an outcome variable and again find posi-
tive effects in the long run.
Early studies on training in western Germany in-
clude Pannenberg (1995), Hujer et al. (1998) and
Hujer and Wellner (2000). These studies use models
of unemployment duration and are based on
GSOEP data covering the second half of the 1980s
and the early 1990s. Again, the results are mixed:
Pannenberg (1995) and Hujer et al. (1998) do not
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Wellner (2000) do find positive effects, but for short-
term programmes only. More recent studies based
on administrative data are Klose and Bender (2000),
Lechner et al. (2004) and Fitzenberger and Speck-
esser (2005). Klose and Bender (2000) use a prelimi-
nary version of the data. Fitzenberger and Speck-
esser (2005) use the final data covering the period
1993Ð1997, while Lechner et al. (2004) base their
study on data covering the larger period of 1993 to
2002.
Klose and Bender (2000) do not find any positive
effects, which might be due to the preliminary char-
acter of their data. In contrast, Lechner et al. (2004)
as well as Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) come
to quite optimistic results. Fitzenberger and Speck-
esser (2005) find negative locking-in effects on the
employment rate in the short run and significantly
positive effects in the long run for training pro-
grammes providing specific professional skills.T h e
findings of Lechner et al. (2004) suggest that short
and long training have positive effects on employ-
ment rates in the short run. In the long run short
training and retraining show positive results. Fur-
thermore, they find significantly positive effects on
monthly earnings for short and long training.
As delineated in section 3, the reform changed the
usage and set up of training in various aspects.F i r st,
positive effects might be expected from the reduc-
tion of participants and deliberate cream skimming
as part of the selection process. Second, the duration
of programmes has been reduced and participation
takes place, on average, at an earlier stage in the
unemployment spell. Third, course quality is ex-
pected to improve due to increased competition be-
tween providers and the priority of efficiency crite-
ria.
The study evaluating training measures post-Hartz
was conducted by IZA, DIW and infas (2005) and
uses administrative data and survey data to compare
the effect of training measures before the reform in
the period 2000 to 2003 with effects after the reform
in the period 2003 to 2005. The results confirm the
previous results of severe locking-in effects. They
suggest that the positive results in the medium and
long run are based on the positive employment ef-
fect on people who otherwise would have drifted
into non-participation. Furthermore, effects of pre-
reform measuress eem to be less positive when tak-
ing employment stability into account. As expected,
the results indicate that the reform succeeded in sig-
nificantly reducing locking-in effects, though evi-
dence on long-term effects of the modified training
measures are not yet available at the present time.
The cost-effectiveness of measures before the re-
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form was negative. By shortening course durations
and better targeting, the reform was able to reduce
the gap between costs and benefits, though the bal-
ance iss till negative.
4.1.3 Job creation schemes
For a long time, job creation schemes could be
evaluated only for eastern Germany because data
sources that provide information on participation in
job creation schemes were limited to eastern Ger-
many only. These are the Labour Market Monitor
East which is used by Hübler (1997), the Labour
Market Monitor of the federal state of Saxony-An-
halt, which is used by Bergemann et al. (2000), Eich-
ler and Lechner (2002) and Bergemann (2005), and
the Saxony microcensus used by Reinowski et al.
(2003).
None of the studies finds positive effects on the em-
ployment rate, apart from Eichler and Lechner
(2002) who find positive employment effects, al-
though for men only. Reinowski et al. (2003) use
the hazard rate of transition from unemployment to
employment as a dependent variable, where unem-
ployment spells include periods of participation.
They do not find positive effects of programme par-
ticipation. Bergemann (2005) finds that for women
participation significantly increases the re-employ-
ment probability. Furthermore, she reportss ignifi-
cantly positive effects on men’s and women’s prob-
ability of remaining employed. Caliendo et al.
(2003) use the recently derived administrative data
for the years 2000Ð2002, which provides informa-
tion on programme effects in western Germany for
the first time. Their results are pessimistic, revealing
negative mean employment effects.P o sitive employ-
ment effects are limited to a few socio-demographic
groups, namely women over 50, the long-term un-
employed and hard-to-place women in western Ger-
many as well as female long-term unemployed in
eastern Germany. However, since the observation
period is rather short, the negative effects might rep-
resent locking-in effectss imilar to those found for
training programmes.
The evaluation study by SÖSTRA, Compass, IMU,
PIW (2005) provides new evidence for the period
2000Ð2004. At the present time, the results on job
creation schemes after Hartz are still preliminary.
The authors use administrative data of people who
entered job creation measures in April of the years
2000 to 2004. Control groups are constructed using
matching methods. The programme effect on the
probability of leaving unemployment is assessed by
comparing the survival functions of treated and non-
treated groups, where unemployment spells includeLena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
the time spent in unemployment before participa-
tion started. The study confirms the generally nega-
tive effects of participation in job creation measures
for time periods before Hartz, though effectss eem
to be positive in the long run in western Germany.
The resultss uggest that the detrimental effects of
job creation measures regarding unemployment du-
ration are entirely caused by the locking-in of parti-
cipants, while stigma effects do not seem to play a
role. Regarding the effects of the Hartz reforms, the
study finds negative treatment effects for the post-
reform period, too, although the magnitude of the
effectss eems to have decreased. Since 2004 it has
been a statutory objective of job creation schemes
to generate or preserve the “employability” of par-
ticipants, rather than providing actual employment
only.
4.2 Activating the unemployed
The Hartz reform shifts priority towards measures
that require active behaviour of the unemployed
and promote their direct integration into regular
employment (cf. section 3.2). To this end, the reform
re-designed integration subsidies, introduced new
forms of wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and jobs
with reduced social security contributions. In the fol-
lowing section we review evaluation studies of such
measures before the reform, if applicable, and sub-
sequently focus on the novel evidence post-reform.
4.2.1 Wage subsidies to employers
The challenge of controlling adequately for self se-
lection is especially difficult in the context of inte-
gration subsidies. Here, selection into treatment
does not only depend on the characteristics of the
participant, but also on characteristics of the poten-
tial employer who will receive the subsidy. The case
worker, moreover, has a wide scope of discretion for
determining whether the characteristics of employer
and employee jointly satisfy the criteria required for
the subsidy. There are only two studies on the effects
of integration subsidies (Eingliederungszuschüsse)
before Hartz. Jaenichen (2002) collects administra-
tive data and survey data for a cohort of unem-
ployed workers that started subsidised employment
between January and April 1999 and a control group
from selected Federal Employment Service districts
throughout Germany. She finds that participating in
integration subsidy programmess ignificantly redu-
ces the probability of a worker being registered as
unemployed. However, this might be partly due to
the fact that, upon entering the programme, partici-
pants are no longer counted as unemployed and
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many participants are still in the programme at the
end of the observation period. In the long run, when
the subsidy has usually expired, the effect iss till
positive, although significantly so only in eastern
Germany. Hujer, Caliendo and Radi (2004) use firm
data to examine whether employing subsidized
workers affects the employment development of
firms.B a sed on the IAB establishment panel data
covering the years 1995Ð1999 they cannot find any
significant effects.
The Hartz reform provided the opportunity to cir-
cumvent the selection problems that were outlined
above, by changing the eligibility conditions for inte-
gration subsidies.T h estudy by ZEW, IAB and IAT
(2005) uses administrative data of the years 2000 to
2003 and exploits the fact that since the beginning
of 2002 older unemployed workers no longer need
to satisfy the condition of being long-term unem-
ployed in order to be eligible for integration subsi-
dies. The effect of wage subsidies on the employ-
ment prospects of older workers is assessed using a
difference-in-differences estimator. The results indi-
cate that integration subsidies increase the probabil-
ity of being employed 6 months after entering un-
employment by 2 percentage points.T h e se effects
seem to stem from significant positive effects in east-
ern Germany only, while in western Germany the
effects are insignificant. Within the target group the
number of windfall beneficiariess eems to be low.
The longer-term effects of integration subsidies on
the probability of being employed after the subsidy
ends is assessed using propensity score matching.
The resultss uggest that, depending on the type,
length and target group of the subsidy, this probabil-
ity is 20 to 50 percentage points higher for the treat-
ment group than for the comparison group. How-
ever, there are some indications of windfall gains.
4.2.2 Start-up subsidies
Only little empirical evidence exists on the effective-
ness of the “bridging allowance” start-up subsidy
(Überbrückungsgeld) for the unemployed. The study
by Pfeiffer and Reize (2000) compares firm survival
and employment growth of start-ups by unemployed
persons receiving the bridging allowance and other,
regular start-ups,b a sed on firm data from 15 regions
in eastern and western Germany. The results indi-
cate that the survival rate and employment effects of
subsidised start-ups do not differ from unsubsidised
start-ups. The Hartz evaluation study by IAB, DIW,
Sinus, GfA, and infas (2005) also provides results on
the effectiveness of the bridging allowance before
the reform. The analysis is based on administrative
data of cohorts entering unemployment in 2000
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start-up subsidies is assessed using matching meth-
ods. The authorss uspect, however, that some selec-
tion bias might remain due to unobservable charac-
teristics of unemployed people who decide to start
u pab u siness. The resultss how that 6 months after
the bridging allowance expires participants have a
lower probability of being unemployed. The effect
iss ignificant at a high level, especially for women.
For the period after the reform, the data iss upple-
mented by survey data for the treatment and control
groups.T h estudy confirms the positive results of
the bridging allowance after the reform.
For the second, new type of start-up subsidy, the so-
called “Me, Inc.” (Ich-AG) subsidy, most partici-
pants are still receiving the subsidy at the end of
the observation period. Information on effects after
eligibility expires is therefore not available yet.
However, the subsidy, which decreases gradually, is
generally very low at the end of the observation pe-
riod. Therefore, the significantly positive effects that
can be observed at that stage might be expected to
persist further as well. At the same time the study
reports indications of windfall gains as a substantial
number of start-up subsidy recipients report that
they would have started a business even without the
subsidy. These figures amount to around 25Ð60%
for bridging allowance recipients, and to 60Ð70% of
individuals in the “Me, Inc.” scheme. Even for these
businesses, however, the subsidy might still have ex-
erted a positive effect during the first months in
business, rather than on business creation per se.
4.2.3 Wage protection for older workers
Wage protection (Entgeltsicherung)i s a wage sub-
sidy for workers aged 50 and older who take up em-
ployment in a job that pays less than their previous
job. The effect of the subsidy on the employment
prospects of older workers iss tudied by ZEW, IAB
and IAT (2005). The analysis employs a difference-
in-differences estimator using administrative data
from the years 2002 and 2003, where workers aged
50 or 51 are the treatment group and workers aged
48 or 49 are the control group. The results indicate
ap o sitive though insignificant effect of the subsidy
on employment probabilities. The authorss uggest
that the insignificance might be due to low take-up
of wage protection.
4.2.4 Employment with reduced social
security contributions (minjob/midijob)
Various reform elements, including the introduction
of minijobs and midijobs, are evaluated in terms of
their impact on the general structure of employ-
ment. These studies are part of the report by RWI
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et al. (2005). The introduction of jobs with reduced
social security contributions for the income range
between 400 and 800 EUR (midijobs), and the re-
form of marginal employment waiving social secu-
rity contributions for incomes below 400 EUR
(minijobs)i s expected to increase the number of
people working in these earningss egments. Mini-
jobs and midijobs constitute a “universal treat-
ment”, i.e. everybody in the labour market is af-
fected, and no comparison group without treatment
exists.I t s effects are examined by firste stimating
the individual probability of each worker being em-
ployed in the respective earningss egment before the
reform, using a fixed-effects linear probability
model. Then, assuming that structural parameters
would have remained identical without the reform,
the counterfactual probability of employment in
these segments is estimated on the basis of post-re-
form data utilising the estimated pre-reform param-
eters. The reform effect is then given by the differ-
ence between the estimated post-reform probabili-
ties using pre-reform coefficients and the actual
post-reform probabilities.
The resultss how that the introduction of midijobs
caused a significant increase of about 125,000 in the
number of employees in this income range, while
the minijob reform caused a huge expansion of em-
ployment in this earningss egment (+1.8 million
minijobs due to the reform). However, this increase
includes approximately 250,000 persons employed in
the income range of 326 to 400 Euros prior to the
reform, who by definition became “minijobbers”.
Also included are around 850,000 persons who hold
their minijob in addition to regular employment, a
status not previously captured in the data.
Moreover, the incidence of intra-enterprised i s-
placement of regular jobs cannot be ruled out, and
employees who benefit from the regulations were
rarely previously unemployed, in spite of hopes as-
sociated with this policy that especially unemployed
individuals would increasingly take on minijobs and
midijobs.T h i s might be due to the fact that the mar-
ginal tax on people who move from unemployment
to employment iss till very high.
4.3 Labour market deregulation
As is the case for the evaluation of the minijobs and
midijobs reforms, deregulation policies regarding
temporary work and fixed-term contracts are evalu-
ated with respect to the general employment struc-
ture. The exemption of small firms from dismissal
protection regulations, however, was not subjected
to an evaluation.Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
4.3.1 Deregulation of temporary work
The reform of temporary work regulations is evalu-
ated in the report by RWI et al. (2005) applying the
same methodology for universal treatments as for
the minijob/midijob evaluation outlined above. The
results indicate that the reform significantly in-
creased the number of employees in the temporary
work sector in the two quarters after the reform. No
data is available yet for longer periods.
4.3.2 Fixed-term contracts for older workers
The effect of older workers being exempt from re-
strictions on fixed-term contracts (erleichterte Befris-
tung älterer Arbeitnehmer/innen)i s assessed by RWI
et al. (2005) using a difference-in-differences estima-
tor. Workers just above the minimum age for ex-
emption (52 to 53 years old) constitute the treat-
ment group, while workers just below this age (50Ð
51 years old) are the control group. The exemption
of workers over 52 years of age from restrictions
on fixed-term contracts is expected to increase the
number of older workers holding fixed-term con-
tracts. The analysis does not reveal any significant
treatment effects.T h i s might be due, however, to the
short observation period, since currently data are
available for only three months after the exemption
was introduced.
4.4 Macro-level evaluation
In the evidence presented above, we have concen-
trated on micro-econometric studies dealing with
single instruments of ALMP and their isolated ef-
fects.T h e se kinds of studies have their virtues, but
the evidence they provide is also limited. They are
unable to uncover substitution and displacement
processes and other effects that affect labour market
performance at aggregate level. This could be the
case in regions like eastern Germany, where labour
market programmes are implemented on a very
large scale. A considerable number of studies try to
grasp such indirect effects in Germany, focusing on
the macroeconomic impact of active labour market
policies. Recent studies include Schmid et al. (2001),
Fertig et al. (2006), Hagen (2003), Blien et al.
(2003), Vollkommer (2004) and Hujer et al. (2005).
All of these studies use administrative data from re-
gional employment offices.M o st studies focus on
some indicators of matching efficiency. Exceptions
are Pannenberg and Schwarze (1996), who examine
wage effects, and Blien et al. (2003), who use re-
gional employment growth as a dependent variable.
The study by Pannenberg and Schwarze (1996) indi-
cates a small negative impact of training measures
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on monthly wages in eastern Germany. Blien et al.
(2003) provide evidence of positive effects of train-
ing and job creation programmes on employment
growth in eastern Germany. There seems to be evi-
dence of displacement effects by job creation
schemes,a s Hagen (2003) suggests. Further results
regarding the effect on matching efficiency and un-
employment rates are very mixed and rather incon-
clusive.
The report by RWI et al. (2005) assesses the macro-
economic effects of ALMP after the Hartz reforms
using administrative data of labour market out-
comes and the respective “policy mix” at regional
level. Regions are constructed as local labour mar-
kets on the basis of commuter flows in order to con-
trol for spill-over effects of regional policies. The re-
sultss uggest that spending a larger amount on start-
up subsidiess ignificantly increases the number of
net exits from unemployment. The introduction of a
new form of start-up subsidy by the Hartz reform
reduced its magnitude, but the effect iss till positive.
In contrast, spending on job creation measures has
a significantly negative effect on net exits from un-
employment in eastern Germany and no effect in
western Germany. Also integration subsidies have
no effects on net exits. Generally, the entire reform,
regardless of the specific policy mix, seems to have
had positive effects on the net exit rate of the short-
term unemployed, while no effects could be found
for the long-term unemployed. The positive results
are mainly driven by positive effects on men.
4.5 Summary of policy effectiveness
before and after Hartz
Table 2 presents an overview of the effectiveness of
various policy measures before and after Hartz. The
table follows the previouss tructure of section 4
(alsou sed in section 3) in distinguishing between
reform elements that aim at a) increasing the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of labour market services and
policy measures, b) activating the unemployed, and
c) deregulating the labour market. The second col-
umn summarises the estimated effects of the respec-
tive policy arising from the available set of evalua-
tion studies conducted before Hartz. Obviously, for
several policies, such as the newly introduced place-
ment vouchers, such an assessment is not applicable.
The third column summarises the results obtained
for each measure in the comprehensive evaluation
of the effectiveness of the Hartz reforms (cf. also
Bundesregierung 2006 and Kaltenborn et al. 2006).
Column 4 is then intended to assess the “before-
after difference”, which Ð with explicit caution ÐBefore and After the Hartz Reforms Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
could be interpreted as a “reform effect” of the
measure. The caution results from the fact that,
whereas the before-after difference may indeed be
caused by the redesign of the measu r e ,i ti s also con-
ceivable that the overall change in the institutional
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framework of the labour and placement markets is
responsible for differentially effective policies pre-
Hartz and post-Hartz.A l so, some evaluation studies
before Hartz are quite distinct in their specific focus
from those conducted after Hartz Ð e.g. the studiesLena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve Before and After the Hartz Reforms
concerning general placement services Ð and hence
are not directly comparable. Another caveat when
interpreting the results is the fact that the post-re-
form observation period iss hort-term only.
The table summarizes the results discussed in more
detail in the previouss ections. Training and public
job creation schemes, both of which were already
used and evaluated extensively before the reform,
appear to have been improved. The “improvement”
of public job creation schemes, however, unfortu-
nately merely implies that since the reform they ap-
pear less detrimental for participants’ employment
prospects than before. For another re-designed
measure, wage subsidies, the reform provided the
first opportunity to consistently evaluate its effects
and thus to reveal its apparently high effectiveness.
Several new measures Ð placement vouchers,a s-
signment to private placement providers, fixed-term
contracts for older workers Ð do not display signifi-
cant effects, which may be due to de facto ineffective
or small-scale policies, or perhaps due to the fact
that the post-reform observation period is not yet
long enough. While placement via temporary work
(PSA) shows negative treatment effects, the new
start-up subsidy significantly reduces the risko fu n -
employment. Both the deregulation of the tempo-
rary work sector and the introduction and reform,
respectively, of jobs with reduced social security
contributions (midijobs and minijobs) appear to
have created additional employment opportunities
in the respective labour market segments. However,
intra-enterprised i splacement effects cannot be
ruled out. The redesign of the customer service of
public employment offices appears promising.
On balance, we therefore find that the Hartz re-
forms in their entirety seem to have contributed to
a better functioning of the German labour market
and the effectiveness of specific active labour mar-
ket policies.T h i s positive assessment, however, has
to be qualified somewhat in the light of the fact that
the starting situation upon which the reforms in-
tended to improve was quite dismal.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have described the features of Ger-
man labour market policy and delineated the ration-
ale for the Hartz reforms implemented in the years
2003Ð2005. We have described the main underlying
principles and the corresponding policy changes.
Following this we have surveyed the existing evi-
dence on the effects of active labour market policy
before and after the reforms.
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German ALMP before Hartz was dominated by
training and public job creation measures.T h e se
measures were characterised by a long duration
compared with other countries.E specially in eastern
Germany the extensive use of job creation measures
created a sheltered labour market of substantial
magnitude. In contrast, measures directly supporting
integration into regular employment (e.g. wage sub-
sidies and start-up subsidies) were introduced rela-
tively recently and played a minor role before. As-
signment to programmes was not based on a system-
atic profiling of clients. Generally, job search assist-
ance and monitoring by the public employment
agency was given rather low priority. It was argued
that the main weaknesses of the former labour mar-
ket policy in Germany were, firstly, public employ-
ment services operating inefficiently, and secondly,
the fact that the interplay of active policy measures
with the generous benefit system created work disin-
centives that retained the unemployed in passivity
rather than stimulating them to integrate into the
regular labour market.
The Hartz reforms aimed at improving employment
services and policy measures, and activating the un-
employed. First, public employment services were
modernised along the lines of New Public Manage-
ment. This includes results-based accountability of
local employment offices, the outsourcing of many
services and open competition between private ser-
vice providers. The former employment offices were
converted into customer-orientated one-stop-cen-
tres, offering individual profiling, job search assist-
ance, social services and administration of benefit
payments. Second, various policy changes imple-
ment an activation strategy according to the princi-
ples of “rights and duties”. The entire benefit system
was re-designed. Unemployment benefit levels and
durations were reduced. Eligibility for subsistence
allowances now differs according to a person’s abil-
ity to work rather than according to previous contri-
bution payments,a s was the case before. Benefit re-
cipients may alsob esubject to sanctions, mainly
benefit reductions, if duties are not complied with.
Priority is given to measures that support unem-
ployed workers who are pro-actively seeking inte-
gration into regular employment, most importantly
wage subsidies and start-up subsidies.J o b s with re-
duced social security contributions were introduced
(midijobs), and the regulation for jobs exempt from
any social security contributions was reformed
(minijobs), both with the intention of providing
greater incentives for individuals to take up employ-
ment in the low-wage sector. Third, the temporary
work sector was deregulated and exemptions from
restrictions on fixed-term contracts and dismissal
protection were introduced.Before and After the Hartz Reforms Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve
Results of evaluation studies of German active la-
bour market policies have been rather inconsistent
for many years.T h i s was probably due to a lack of
appropriate data, or to the sensitivity of results with
respect to different identification strategies. How-
ever, due to better data, advances in methodology
and a higher consensus on identification strategies,
recent evaluation studiess eem to be able to provide
more robust and consistent results. For the pre-
Hartz period, it can be concluded for example that
most training measuress eem to show considerable
dynamics in programme effects, having negative
(locking-in) effects in the short run and a tendency
towards positive employment effects in the long run.
Based on such results, future cost-benefit analyses
might be able to trade costs of negative short-run
effects against benefits of positive long-run effects.
Moreover, there is evidence that job creation
schemes perform badly on average in the short run,
and actually result in impaired employment
prospects for participants. The (limited) evidence on
wage subsidies and start-up subsidies pre-Hartz indi-
cates modestly positive effects of such measures.
The comprehensive evaluation of the Hartz reforms,
which involves more than 20 research institutions
and a total of about 100 researchers,h a s produced
rich evidence giving the general impression that the
effectiveness of measures has improved modestly.
The results, which are still preliminary at the present
time, indicate that the re-organisation of public em-
ployment services was mainly successful, with the
exception of the outsourcing of services. Re-design-
ing training programmess eems to have improved
their effectiveness, while job creation schemes con-
tinue to be detrimental to the probability of re-em-
ployment. Policy measuress uch as the redesigned
wage subsidies and start-up subsidiess how signifi-
cantly positive effects.T h u s, the new strategy, with
more emphasis on wage subsidies and start-up subsi-
dies and less emphasis on training and public job
creation schemes, seems to be a promising mix of
active labour market policies, moving the German
labour market in the right direction. It seems clear,
however, considering the continuing crisis of the
German economy, that further steps have to be
taken.
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